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University of California Irvine
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Graduate Researcher

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The time-to-market pressure and the continuous growing complexity of hardware designs have promoted the globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain. However, such globalization also poses various security threats in each phase of the IC supply chain. Although the advancements of Machine Learning (ML) have pushed the frontier of hardware security, most conventional ML-based methods can only achieve the desired performance by manually finding a robust feature representation for circuits that are non-Euclidean data. As a result, modeling these circuits using graph learning to imp


Design and fabrication outsourcing has made integrated circuits vulnerable to malicious modifications by third parties known as hardware Trojan (HT). Over the last decade, the use of side-channel measurements for detecting the malicious manipulation of the chip has been extensively studied. However, the suggested approaches mostly suffer from two major limitations: reliance on trusted identical chip (e.i. golden chip); untraceable footprints of subtle hardware Trojans which remain inactive during the testing phase.