Website Fingerprinting - Last Level Cache Contention Traces
Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assumes an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the secure network.
Untar the data.
Every directory means different settings of the data collection:
linux_chrome: the data was collected on linux OS using chrome browser.
linux_ff59:the data was collected on linux OS using firefox browser.
linux_tor:the data was collected on linux OS using Tor browser.
win_chrome: the data was collected on windows10 OS using chrome browser.
win_ff59:the data was collected on windows10 oS using firefox browser.
mac_safari: the data was collected on Mac machine using safari browser.
linux_tor_counter :the data was collected on linux OS using Tor browser while running countermeasures.
CW: closed worls detting , every website appear several times.
OW: open worls setting, every website appear only one (or very few) times.
Use the following online colab script to run the test set on the classifiers;
- cacheprints.tar (140.23 GB)
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