Security

Design and fabrication outsourcing has made integrated circuits vulnerable to malicious modifications by third parties known as hardware Trojan (HT). Over the last decade, the use of side-channel measurements for detecting the malicious manipulation of the chip has been extensively studied. However, the suggested approaches mostly suffer from two major limitations: reliance on trusted identical chip (e.i. golden chip); untraceable footprints of subtle hardware Trojans which remain inactive during the testing phase.

This is the dataset provided and collected while "Car Hacking: Attack & Defense Challenge" in 2020. We are the main organizer of the competition along with Culture Makers and Korea Internet & Security Agency. We are very proud of releasing these valuable datasets for all security researchers for free.

The competition aimed to develop attack and detection techniques of Controller Area Network (CAN), a widely used standard of in-vehicle network. The target vehicle of competition was Hyundai Avante CN7.

Figure Data Backup for paper, "Co-Evolution of Malware Threats in the U.S. Commercial Sector and Defense Industrial Base"

The dataset contains memory dump data which is generated continuously. For the experiment we carried out, we implemented the volatile data dump module which generated around 360 VM memory dump images of average size 800Mb each (Total 288GB). These data files are compressed using gzip utility. Further zipped to 79.5GB one single file of memory evidence.
Out of these preserved and stored memory dump dataset, 79 files of size 17.3GB were generated during the attack. This means the data 21.76% of data (in size) is potential evidence.